A Critical Consideration of Hume’s View of the Origin and
Content of the Belief in Human Soul/Spirit
Meysam
Shadpoor
PhD student of Islamic philosophy, Baqir al-‘Ulum University, Qom, Iran
author
Sayyed Mahmoud
Musawi
Associate professor, Baqir al-‘Ulum University, Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
David Hume, an empiricist philosopher, accounts for the contents of conceptions and beliefs by observing their origins; since he thinks that according to the copy principle a conception or belief with a vague origin—one that cannot be traced back to a specific impression—has no specific content and will thus be absurd. Hume adopts the same approach in his account of the origin and content of the belief in the human soul or self or spirit, concluding that the belief in souls is neither rational, nor intuitive (the negative view)—indeed, it is originated in imaginations and is, therefore, erroneous and yet unavoidable (the positive view). In this paper, we will draw on the descriptive-analytic method to consider and criticize Hume’s account of this and show that, on the one hand, his positive view is not satisfactory, involving a number of epistemic gaps, and on the other, he has ignored the role of knowledge by presence in his account of the belief in the soul.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
6
29
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69323_08789898b7c6267fc6f34c23977462ea.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.58789.1771
A Consideration of the Compatibility of the Theory of the Immateriality of the Soul with Quranic Doctrines concerning the Afterlife
mahdi
zakeri
Associate professor, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
A majority of Muslim philosophers believe that the human is composed of an immaterial soul and a body, where his nature is constituted by the immaterial soul. The immateriality of the soul implies that after its death and detachment from the body, the immaterial soul will survive without a need for a body, on the one hand, and will need no external factors for its survival, on the other. What is implied by the Quran, however, is that the human does not survive by itself and is annihilated with death. Thus, the human posthumous survival depends on God who gives a new life to some or all people with His power or revives them after an interval. The method of this paper is a composition of a logical analysis of the implications of the theory of the immateriality of the soul and a consideration of the implications of central Quranic verses concerning death, as well as a comparison between the two. The paper aims to show that the philosophical theory of immateriality of the soul is not compatible with some Quranic doctrines concerning death and afterlife.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
30
53
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69324_87fdf11062ec35b0e26cd01c16302f8d.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.58928.1778
A Proof for the Eternity of the Soul in Plato’s View and its Implication for Avicenna’s Argument from the Soul’s Simplicity for its Eternity (A Historical Consideration)
Mehdi
Asgari
MA, Qom, Iran
author
Yousef
Daneshvar Nilu
Assistant professor, Imam Khomeini Institute, Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
In his Phaedo, Plato has presented three arguments for the soul’s posthumous eternity. The first two arguments are articulated in a mythical-philosophical way on the basis of consecutive cycles of births. The third argument presented by Plato for the soul’s survival after death is an argument from the soul’s simplicity. He maintains that what has no parts is not corruptible, and since the soul has no parts, it will be eternal after the bodily death and will not be annihilated. In Islamic philosophy, one of the most important issues about the soul is the soul’s eternity and its posthumous survival. Avicenna—the great Peripatetic philosopher—has presented arguments for the soul’s eternity. We believe that his most important argument is the argument for the soul’s eternity from simplicity, which was anticipated by Plato. In this paper, we seek to provide a historical consideration and analysis of Plato’s view and its impact on Avicenna’s simplicity argument. The method adopted by this paper is historical, involving citations of the texts, particularly those of Avicenna. The short reply to the main question of the paper is that Avicenna’s argument for the soul’s eternity from simplicity has a historical Platonic spirit.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
54
74
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69325_2853028fea1b4619ab188551edb966c1.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.57326.1721
A Study of Dreams in the Views of Aristotle and Avicenna
Mohammad Hossein
Mokhtari
Associate professor, Imam Khomeini Institute, Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
The problem of dreams is an important problem discussed by philosophers throughout history. In ancient Greece, Aristotle wrote an independent essay on dreams, and Muslim philosophers have tied the problem of dreams with prophethood. The philosophical reflections of Avicenna, as the greatest philosopher in the Islamic world, on the matter are of utmost importance. He discusses dreams in terms of his account of the existence of the soul, its immateriality, and its faculties, particularly the imagination. On the other hand, Aristotle deals with dreams and their nature in terms of perception and the imaginative faculty. The main question in this paper is to elaborate and consider the accounts of dreams provided by these two philosophers. The paper seeks to uncover the distinctions and commonalities between the two, and the impact Aristotle had on Avicenna’s account of dreams. The method is a comparative study of the two philosophers from the point of view of philosophy and the history of philosophy. The paper concludes that Avicenna has contributed great subtleties in his account of soul and dreams, although he was influenced by Aristotle.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
75
96
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69326_62ffe23a43d1ee80c05a2e0ba3056459.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.57547.1724
A Comparative Study of the Ontology of Meaning in the Views of Fayḍ Kāshānī and ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī
Mohammad Javad
Mansoorsamaei
PhD student, Teaching Islamic Doctrines (subfield: texts), College of Theology, University of Tehran (Farabi Campus), Qom, Iran
author
Mohammad Ali
Mahdavirad
Faculty member of University of Tehran
Department of Shiology, Faculty of Theology, University of Tehran (Farabi Campus), Qom, Iran
author
Hamed
Purrostami
Associate professor, College of Theology, University of Tehran (Farabi Campus), Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
The ontology of meaning seeks to find the truth and nature of the meanings of words; that is, it search the nature of meaning. Western intellectuals have dealt with the problem, providing a variety of theories in this regard, such as the token theory, the conceptual theory, the pictorial theory, and so on. Given the particular position of the issue in Quranic exegesis, the principles of jurisprudence, and certain theological problems, Muslim scholars need to provide an account for it. Thus, in this paper we deploy the descriptive-analytic method to reread and account for the views of two prominent Shiite scholars and exegetes, Fayḍ Kāshānī and ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Having considered their theory of the “spirit of meaning”—which is an important theory in Quranic exegesis and on which both insist, with remarkable agreements between the two views—we argue that this cannot be endorsed as a “theory of meaning” although some people have tried to derive a theory of meaning from it, since it offers no answer to the question of what meaning is. On this account, although there are statements in their work which might imply their inclination toward a token or pictorial theory of meaning, they both endorse only the ideational (conceptual) theory of meaning.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
97
126
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69327_2739075910c1070ccb7753441580a6a9.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.56660.1697
Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī and His Critique of Ibn ‘Arabī’s Theory of the Unity of Existence
Morteza
Karbalaei
Lecturer of advanced levels of philosophy and mysticism in the Seminary of Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
he theory of the unity of existence is one of the most fundamental doctrines of Islamic Sufism and mysticism. According to Muslim mystics, the only true existent is God, and creatures are manifestations and modes of this true existent. The idea was there since the formative period of Islamic mysticism, and found its more accurate accounts after Ibn ‘Arabī’s emergence. Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī—an influential mystic in the 14th century—rejected this theory. In this paper, I deploy an analytic method to consider and criticize Simnānī’s objections to the theory of the unity of existence, after preliminary remarks about his life and work as well as the circumstances of his time. Thus, I argue that Simnānī has criticized Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the unity of existence and believed in the unity of intuition, instead, because of his belief in the necessity of the separation between Islamic doctrines and Indian religions such as Buddhism for purposes of preventing distortions in Islamic monotheism; because of his failure to grasp the depths of Ibn ‘Arabī’s words about the absolutely unconditioned existence which involves exaltation of God; and because of his confusion of various considerations of existence. Moreover, Simnānī does not believe that the unity of intuition is the ultimate stage of mystical journey, taking the last stage to be that of servitude.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
127
148
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69328_e4652058298774e0aeff731c2e812e10.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.55875.1670
The Role of the “Simple Reality” Principle in Proving the
Attributive Monotheism
Leila
Baneshi
PhD student, Islamic theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
author
Ahmad
Fazeli
Assistant professor, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
author
Ali
Allah Bedashti
Professor of Philosophy and Kalam, University of Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2020
per
The divine essence has all perfective attributes because of the necessity of His existence—that is, every attribute that counts as an existential perfection is absolutely true of God. Now the question arises: What is the relation between these perfective attributes and the divine essence? This paper seeks to provide an account of attributive monotheism based on the “simple reality” (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) principle. Here we adopt a descriptive-analytic approach to consider the role of the “simple reality” principle in proving the attributive monotheism. Mullā Ṣadrā makes an appeal to the “simple reality” principle to prove all perfective attributes for God as identical to His essence. His argument for the identification of divine attributes and the divine existence is grounded in the simplicity of the necessary existence and His exaltation from all kinds of quiddity-based compositions. Moreover, this principle implies that the necessary being has all perfective attributes
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
25
v.
99
no.
2020
149
173
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_69329_6bdd47da2388ea5e1acdbc5d1a1347eb.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22081/jpt.2020.56407.1690