What is "Ethical Philosophy"? (On the possibility and desirability of establishing a new branch in philosophical ethics)
masoud
omid
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
author
text
article
2014
per
In the history of moral and ethical studies, there has never been a field of "ethical philosophy". In this paper, I shall show that, in addition to other moral fields, such a field is both possible and desirable. Researchers in moral issues (in ethics, moral philosophy, history of ethics and the like) have largely focused on looking "into ethics" in a philosophical, historical or whatever way. In "ethical philosophy", however, we must look "with ethics" in a philosophical way, that is, "we should look at the reality with ethics, contemplating the realities in a philosophical and theoretical manner, expressing them with a philosophical language." In ethical philosophy, moral look lies at the horizon of contemplation and philosophical language, and it is in this respect that we might call it "ethical philosophy", that is "a philosophy based on ethics", rather than just ethics or moral philosophy. Generally, we might say that ethical studies are in the following types: (i) pre-ethical (such as meta-ethics and normative ethics) or (ii) ethical (such as ethics, moral psychology, and moral anthropology) or (iii) post-ethical (such as applied ethics). Ethical philosophy is a general, philosophical (rather than applied and particular) study of a post-ethical character.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
4
25
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_54_71dc3fdaccb523e9eff68ce753545fd0.pdf
A Comparative Study of the Effect of Intention on the Legitimacy of an Action_In Usul and Analytic Philosophy
mahdi
mhomazade
.دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه ذهن، پژوهشکده علوم شناختی
author
text
article
2014
per
In this paper, I will first explicate the doctrine of double effect (DDE)_the effect of intentions on the legitimacy of an action_and then present the arguments provided by opponents of DDE. I will then examine the replies by proponents of DDE, together with evidence they have provided for their theories. I evaluate the views of the both sides, and seek to show that the arguments provided by the opponents of DDE are not cogent enough to undermine the intuitive appeal of DDE. Finally, I will compare this issue with views in Usul al-fiqh (principles of the Islamic jurisprudence) regarding the effect of intention on the legitimacy of an action_I suggest that they seem sympathetic to a principle like DDE. I also discuss the problem of effrontery (tajarri) in Usul al-fiqh that has led to controversies over the effect of an agent's bad intentions on the illegitimacy of his action. I will show that the proponents of such an effect have a stronger argument.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
26
51
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_55_ae21a1821d16445e9c09b236b966e044.pdf
An Analysis of the role of Ontological Principles in Tabatabaei's Siddiqin Argument
ali
Allahdad Hezaveh
کارشناسیارشد فلسفه و حکمت از دانشگاه قم (نویسنده مسئول)
author
Hossein
Habibitabar
.استادیاردانشگاه آزاد واحد ساوه
author
text
article
2014
per
With an analysis of the considerations (itibārāt) of the existence in order to achieve a correct understanding of the necessary being (wājib al-wujūd), we will show that of these considerations, only the dividum version of the existence-as-non-conditionally-being-something (lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī) can apply to God.To understand Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei's conception of the necessary being and due to the importance of his formulation of the Siddīqīn Argument, we will investigate his ontological principles, showing that he prefers the personal unity (al-waḥda al-shakhṣiyya) of existence, which amounts to the dividum version of the existence-as-nonconditionally-being-something. This is shown by his formulation of the two important philosophical principles of "ṣirf al-shay" (the mere entity) and "basiṭ al-ḥaqiqa" (simple reality). We find two formulations of the Siddīqīn argument in Tabatabaei's work. Not recognizing these two formulations has led to different approaches to this argument even among his pupils.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
52
71
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_56_1cd6b00ebdcd581afdee2a5ea011f31e.pdf
Searle and the Problem of Consciousness
Mahdi
Zakeri
استادیار دانشگاه تهران،پردیس فارابی
author
Sayyed Mostafa
Hosseini
کارشناس ارشد فلسفه (گرایش منطق)
author
text
article
2014
per
Consciousness is one of the major challenges that philosophy and even contemporary sciences encounter. John Searle holds that the solution to the problem of consciousness is not so hard-it might be solved if we have precise knowledge of the brain and its states. Searle calls this solution "biological naturalism" which amounts to the claim that the brain the cause of consciousness. He does not want to eliminate consciousness at all, though he claims that there is a close link between brain states and mental states. He makes a distinction between two sorts of reduction (ontological and causal) and seeks to consider consciousness in terms of causal reduction, thereby maintaining the independent existence of consciousness. His reliance on empirical sciences and his attempt to avoid dualistic consequences led him to keep consciousness within the realm of the causal relations of the nature, though he accepts the thesis of causal closure. His solution for this problem is the so-called "ontological subjectivity". This allows Searle to make it possible scientifically study subjective entities, just like objective ones.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
72
93
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_57_92d5a92c7c3b449b9de0c3ac3357e8f0.pdf
Safe Belief: an Examination of Sosa's Version of the Safety Condition for Knowledge
peyman
jabbari
دانشجوی دکتری پژوهشگاه دانشهای بنیادی و طلبة حوزة علمیة مشهد مقدس
author
text
article
2014
per
In this paper, I will explicate Nozick's truth-tracking theory of knowledge and objections raised against it, and I will then deal with Sosa's primary and reformed versions of the subjunctive conditional of safety as a necessary condition of knowledge. I will then consider some objections to Sosa's view, showing that some of these counterexamples work against Sosa's view. However, I have sought to show that some of these objections do not work against a more precise version of this condition. I have also shown that this condition cannot deal with some counterexamples of Nozick's theory.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
94
119
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_58_2e94c5828a60a0fdc1f593047581b1bb.pdf
A Comparative Evaluation of Michael J. Sandel and Alan Haworth's Views on Rawls's Liberalism
Akram
Nourizadeh
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان
author
Yusof
Shaghool
دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان
author
text
article
2014
per
Michael Sandel is communitarian thinker who challenges John Rawls's views in Theory of Justice,holding that there are mistakes in the book's presuppositions, arguments, and conclusions. In contrast, Alan Haworth defends Rawls's views, replying to some objections by Sandel. In this paper, we want to see whether liberalism presupposes abstract individualism, as Sandel and other critics of Rawls maintain, or not. We will also consider the claim made by Sandel that in order to understand our real identity, we need to bear in mind the interests, beliefs and loyalties on which our indetities depend, though Rawlsian 'self' is free of such interests, beliefs and loyalties. Hawort argues that: 1) Sandel’s account of the manner in which constitutive loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being underivable particular obligations, but that such obligations are, in fact, logically impossible, and 2) Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily encumbered presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is fundamentally flawed.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
120
146
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_59_e2a42500fa954da1bda6a7f8f0902ca3.pdf
An Examination of Hadiths Concerning the Negation of Attributes from God and their Significance
Sayyed Mohammad
Banihashemi
دانشیار دانشگاه آزاد
author
Iman
Roshanbin
دانشجوی دکتری کلام امامیّه، دانشگاه علوم قرآن و حدیث،پردیس تهران.
author
text
article
2014
per
Some of the most important issues in Islamic philosophy and kalam regarding divine attributes go back to the existence and the nature of these attributes and their relations with God. These issues, sometimes classified under 'attribute-monotheism' are very important in religious ontology, and has, at some point in the history, led to controversies about monotheism and polytheism among Muslim thinkers. Such issues are called ontological problems of divine attributes. In this paper we seek to show that hadiths concerning the negation of attributes from God signify that divine attributes are conceived as created entities. In other words, 'attributes' have been used in these hadiths to mean 'signs', and God's being attributed means that God has made such creatures as his attributes, that is, signs, and no more. Therefore, all attributes are created entities, and they are things with which God or Allah is signified.
Naqd Va Nazar
Islamic Propagation Office, Qom Seminary
Islamic Science and Culture Academy
1062-8952
19
v.
73
no.
2014
147
169
https://jpt.isca.ac.ir/article_60_1412ba74792de9a9999b31de65d37532.pdf